“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it....” - Osama bin Laden- February 1998
Osama bin Laden issued his “fatwa” only seven months before the U.S. embassies were bombed on August 7, 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania. We could have increased our security measures everywhere, yet we were unprepared to avoid the disastrous destruction of the World Trade Centers on September 11, 2001.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden offered to organize his Arab Afghan fighters to defend the Saudi Kingdom. The royal family instead invited U.S. troops, which Osama bin Laden considered “infidels” occupying Muslim soil, and declared a “jihad” against the United States. He didn’t want any foreign troops in the “land of the two mosques”--Mecca and Medina. His protest led to house arrest, and was asked to leave Saudi Arabia in 1991.
Sudan was the only country to offer refuge to Osama bin Laden, and more than one hundred of his al-Qaeda fighters, including Ayman Zawahiri, the chief planner of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Wadih El-Hage his personal secretary, and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed the leader of the U.S. embassy bombings. While in Sudan Osama bin Laden trained al-Qaeda insurgents, who were involved in the 1993 attacks on U.S. and UN soldiers in Somalia, the 1993 World Trade Center garage bombing, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
In October 2000 suicide bombers attacked the USS Cole destroyer at the Port of Aden in Yemen. The Sudan government reportedly helped al-Qaeda move the explosives in diplomatic pouches to Yemen, which had become a safe haven for al-Qaeda insurgents returning from Afghanistan. Today Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen, is responsible for numerous attacks in Iraq, and is involved in the regime change in Syria.
Killing Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011 has not seen a decline in al-Qaeda’s influence in the region. CNN reported on October 12, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s leader and Muslim Brotherhood hardliner, stated that, “Libyans should move quickly to establish Sharia, the Islamic law” and further called on Algerians “to follow in the footsteps of your brothers in Libya and Tunisia and revolt against your tyrant”. He also reaffirmed the jihad against the United States.
When the Arab Spring began, Muammar Gaddafi warned “that al-Qaeda would take over Libya if he is overthrown”. Since Gaddafi’s assassination by Islamist militias, large caches of weapons have fallen into the hands of al-Qaeda linked Islamists embedded in Libya, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Sharia, Libyan Islamic Fighters, Ansar Dine, Boko Haram, and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA). These Islamists are dangerous and well-armed, and many were involved in the U.S. consulate attack in Benghazi.
When Mali’s President Amadou Touré was deposed in March 2012, Secretary Clinton insisted, “Only a democratically elected government will have the legitimacy to achieve a negotiated political settlement in northern Mali, end the rebellion, and restore the rule of law”. French President Hollande disagreed, saying, “How can we organize elections when northern Mali is occupied by terrorist movements that don’t apply democracy”, further stating, “Mali’s territorial integrity should be restored as soon as possible and that any lost time would only complicate matters”.
There were three UN resolutions passed to deal with the Islamists in Mali. The last called for “a readiness to respond to Mali’s request for an international military force”, but UN action was withheld until it became clear the Islamists were moving south to takeover Bamako, the capital. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had opposed action for almost eleven months stating, “The United Nations was developing a strategy on the Sahel that would look as a whole at issues including security, response to large-scale crises, and the promotion of democratic governance”.
The ECOWAS and African Union troops were ready to support the Malian military, and could have been deployed in April 2012, before the Islamist extremists took control of northern Mali. On January 10, 2013 the Islamists started to move south to within 400 miles from Bamako. Answering Mali’s desperate plea, on January 11, France sent 600 military troops as advisers, but soon were battling the Islamists. French jet fighters and helicopter gunships came from a base in nearby Chad to attack Islamist strongholds.
The U.S. reluctantly agreed to supply aircraft to ferry French and African troops, and to provide intelligence. This week the U.S. agreed to refuel French aircraft with our KC-135 tankers. To counteract the strength of the Islamists, the French had to bring in an additional 1,900 troops. Several African countries have also joined the coalition, with over 3,000 military troops.
The AQIM had warned that they were ready to fight the Western powers for some time. After my meetings with Mali government leaders in September 2012, I wrote several articles on the need for UN support of military action—and to help train and equip the ECOWAS and Mali military--but Western military units in Mali were not contemplated.
The Algerian government had warned against Western intervention in the region, even before the U.S. led incursion into Libya. Secretary Clinton meeting with President Bouteflika in October 2012 asked for his cooperation in subduing the AQIM Islamists. He was very familiar with these terrorists who had their roots in Algeria, and were chased into Mali in 2003—he didn’t want them coming back.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, one of AQIM leaders was angered by the French troops coming to Mali, and retaliated on January 16, 2013, with the attack on the “In Amenas” gas facility in eastern Algeria. The Algerian military acted quickly to subdue the terrorists, since negotiation was not an option. In the ensuing the battle with the Islamists, three American and thirty multinational hostages were killed.
Osama bin Laden’s fatwa is still in place, and jihadists will continue to attack U.S. embassies, consulates and our economic interests. We were warned that the Islamists wanted to take control, and rule under Sharia law. The U.S. decision-makers had a myopic view of this vast Muslim populated desert region, believing that democratic institutions would follow regime change.
Protecting U.S. interests and American citizens will be difficult, as we witnessed in Benghazi and Algeria recently. The U.S. aided the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt; al-Qaeda linked Islamists that have a strong presence in Libya; Salafi Islamists that are gaining political influence in the Maghreb states. Mali is at war with the AQIM Islamists fighting for its freedom; affiliated Islamists are spreading across the Sahel region. These emboldened Islamists will continue to be a threat to U.S. security in Africa, and elsewhere in the world.
John Price served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Mauritius, Republic of Seychelles, and Union of the Comoros from February 8, 2002 to June 17, 2005 and currently serves as a Resident Scholar at the University of Utah’s Hinckley Institute of Politics. He is the author of the book “When the White House Calls” and regularly writes commentaries on Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.