Commentaries

“The battle against al-Qaeda will not be primarily military. It will be political, economic, and ideological. It will require the international community to fight, too. We must not let al-Qaeda get hold of any country. It will result in our worst nightmare. Picture life in Afghanistan under the Taliban, that is what al Qaeda’s ideology has as a goal.”  General John Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM, in his speech at the Naval War College, November 10, 2005.

The recent Wall Street Journal article of December 7, 2012, Terror Fight Shifts to Africa, noted the “U.S. Considers Seeking Congressional Backing for Operations Against Extremists.”  This article could have been written in 1991, when the U.S. supported the al-Saud dynasty, out of self-preservation, shipped Osama bin Laden and his mujahedeen fighters from Afghanistan off to Sudan—the only country that would take this dangerous band of terrorists. There they were for the next five years plotting and planning worldwide terrorist attacks, right under the eyes of our intelligence sources stated at the U.S. embassy in Khartoum.

I have been researching the influence of terrorists for almost ten years. At each juncture it brought me to the conclusion that as we drive the terrorists out of Afghanistan and Iraq, they would become embedded in Yemen, and eventually gravitated to the Horn of Africa, becoming the epicenter for al-Qaeda, which in Arabic means ‘Base’. It was under his premise when bin Laden established his base in Afghanistan in 1987. Al-Qaeda became a jihadist movement, a broad theology, of armed jihad that goes back to 1734 when Wahhabi established his form of Islam with the power sharing agreement with al-Saud. Osama bin Laden is a disciple, as were most of his early followers. The jihadist movement has grown beyond bin Laden’s influence. Today it can be found throughout North Africa ingrained in the Salafist movement, which energized a new generation of jihadists. The radical Islamists can all be grouped together under a wider jihadist movement, which wants to take North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula back to the 12th century when Sultan Saladin ruled over a vast empire, under a caliphate.

I would be naïve to believe otherwise, and characterize the Islamists who are bent on creating Islamic states, ruled under Sharia, the Islamic law, as a passing moment in history. It is a movement that is over a thousand years old and revived by Osama bin Laden, through well documented jihad against the U.S. His fatwa should have been a warning of the dangers that lay ahead. The U.S. has been too focused on regime change, to establish our form of democracy, and remove dictators, when in reality we were doing the Islamists work for them. Expect Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq to become Islamic states. The five countries in North Africa will follow, as possibly will the Sahel countries, if we leave them unprotected—as we are seeing in Mali. Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad are at risk as well.

Increased insurgent attacks in Iraq and escalating instability and expansion of terrorist cells in the Horn of Africa and East Africa region prompted a Chiefs of Mission Conference in Djibouti for two days of briefings with top military leaders, including General John Abizaid. I met up with seven other ambassadors in Nairobi, and on Monday, February 16, 2003

We landed on the ten-thousand-foot runway at Camp Lemonier—formerly a French Foreign Legion post and now home to the CJTF-HOA. We were greeted at the plane by seven heavily armored SUVs,

Security concerns in the region were the overriding topic of all the speakers. Discussing the dangers of radical imams teaching in the madrassas, General John Abizaid noted this was a global issue and not isolated to any one region. Furthermore, he referenced for us (and later would testify the same at a March 2004 Congressional hearing) that terrorists are Jihad Salafists and that eliminating the senior leadership of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and networks would not eliminate terrorism. What was needed, he said, was support for host nations in education, health, and infrastructure to enhance stability. I thought he was right on target—but I wondered if members of Congress would understand this message.

During my sixth visit to Seychelles, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to meet on September 6 with General John Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM, to discuss security issues. We met in Seychelles. He was accompanied by Admiral Bob Moeller, Colonel Don Zimmer, Ambassador John Holzman (the State Department senior political advisor), and several other military staff. Jeannette D’Offay, in the ministry of foreign affairs, representing the government of Seychelles, greeted them, and soon we were on our way to the Berjaya Hotel at Beau Vallon Bay. That evening over dinner, our discussion centered on the origins of today’s Islamic fundamentalist thinking. We believed that the United States needed to spend more money, time, and energy on secular education—basic reading, writing, math, sciences, and economic opportunity training and mentoring. We agreed it would take a long time to rid the world of terrorists, as we were fighting not an army or a nation but erratic individuals who could cause a lot of damage by acting alone. We also agreed that catching Osama bin Laden would not change any of the problems we were facing. Rather, young people in these very poor countries needed hope and a desire to live for some tangible reason, rather than being coerced to die in the name of Islam.

We recognize that al-Qaeda operatives know how to operate under the radar. They also know how the Areas of Responsibility function between the different military commands of EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM with their “fuzzy seamless borders” in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. In my meeting on April 28, 2005, with General John Abizaid, I discussed this issue and the need to consider unifying the USCOM structure in sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean region under one command, which would provide for a seamless operation. On February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush announced the creation of a unified U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to be headquartered in sub-Saharan Africa. Under this command, all military operations would be placed in one or multiple locations in Africa. According to the February 6, 2007, press release from the Office of the Press Secretary, this new command would “strengthen our security cooperation with Africa, and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. [The] Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa, and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.” On October 1, 2007, AFRICOM officially unified the fifty-two African countries under one command (with Egypt remaining under CENTCOM), temporarily headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. AFRICOM was to be fully operational by September 30, 2008. Some sub-Saharan African countries have already expressed that they do not want U.S. troops stationed on their soil. Locating AFRICOM in Djibouti would make sense logistically since we already have an established presence. Blending the resources of EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM into the U.S. AFRICOM would make for an easy transition. There are risks, however, with this concentration in Djibouti and our ability to move quickly to the vast reaches of North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa from there.

The AQIM could have been subdued ever since 2003 when they infiltrated Mali’s northern frontier. Instead this desert region has become a safe haven for Islamists linked to al-Qaeda. U.S. intelligence sources have known that northern Mali was becoming a breeding ground for these terrorists. In 2005 the U.S. launched the “Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative”, a military training program in Mali, which included the twelve neighboring countries; additional training took place in 2007 by Special Operations Forces. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) had considered a base in northern Mali, but the idea never materialized. Our lack of continued military support to subdue the Islamists left the Sahel region unprepared to deal with the growing threat from the well-armed and financed Islamists. Northern Mali has become the ‘epicenter’ for terrorists coming from Niger, Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, and as far away as Pakistan and Afghanistan.

With the large amount of weapons smuggled out of Libya, the Malian military was outgunned by the Islamists. In January 2012 over eighty soldiers were slaughtered in northern Mali. The frustration by the Malian military led to the ousting of President Amadou Toumani Toure in March 2012. Since then the Islamists have only increased in numbers. The July 5, 2012 UN Security Council Resolution 2056 was adopted to deal with the Islamists in northern Mali. However approval for action was withheld by the UN, which would have allowed ECOWAS military to intervene in Mali.

Meanwhile AQIM has expanded across the Sahel and north into Libya. Secretary Hillary Clinton and UN Ambassador Susan Rice continue to insist that the election process take place first, and discussions proceed with the radical Islamists. Mali government leaders told me early in September that the election process was on-track for April 2013. However military support, by ECOWAS, to subdue the Islamists was the urgent priority.

Reconciliation with the Islamists would be rewarding them for killing and maiming; destroying historical artifacts, several of the elders noted. The Malian Diaspora in the refugee camps fear these radical Islamists, and would rather to stay in the camps than go back home to Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal where family members continue to suffer from on-going atrocities. Any negotiations with these Salafi Islamists would also be time consuming—something Mali cannot afford–since the influx of new recruits joining the AQIM movement continues daily unabated. Negotiating with these Islamists would further show a sign of weakness, and give them the confidence that they can ultimately win.

Today’s enemy has no name, no face, no uniform, and not even a standing army. It is a theological movement with a mission to control the world under Sharia. Congress was shortsighted in cutting funds for effective embassy operations beginning in the 1990s. We need to have embassies in all 193 countries Some of these countries are in strategic locations, while others are in more dangerous or conflicted areas. All embassies must operate in a more secure environment.

We continued to build up our military might for future ground-style campaigns, but did not see the brewing danger of terrorism that would erupt into a new, different kind of warfare. We could have learned a lesson in the early 1980s, when there were 36 suicide attacks against Americans and others inside Lebanon. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut was bombed by Hezbollah in April 1983. The U.S. established a peacekeeping force to control the conflict between Muslims and Christians. The Muslim military viewed our soldiers as their enemies and attacked them regularly. In October 1983, truck bombs struck two barracks housing U.S. and French troops. The Islamic Jihad took responsibility. In December 1983, a truck filled with explosives rammed into a three-story administrative wing of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City.. That attack was claimed by a radical Shiite Islamic group with ties to Iran.

There were many signs of al-Qaeda’s presence in the Horn of Africa and East Africa beginning in the 1990s. The United States had enough warnings and knowledge from the prior embassy attacks to upgrade and protect, or replace every embassy.

In the mid-1990s Congress mandated budget cuts for our embassy operations, which precluded the necessary security upgrades. In essence our foreign affairs budget was drastically reduced. Subsequent terrorist attacks, and threat of attacks, against our embassies gave rise to an increased budget for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DSS).

In 1996 Ambassador Prudence Bushnell sent cables to the State Department regarding the lack of proper security at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. A Department official felt the ambassador was overreacting on these security concerns; a security team was sent to inspect the embassy and reported that it met ‘their’ standards for a medium-threat facility. General Anthony Zinni visited the embassy in early 1998 and reported there were significant risks—the embassy would be an easy target for terrorists. The U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam was no better protected from potential terrorist attacks. Yet the State Department felt no security upgrades were necessary.

But on August 7, 1998, the bombings of both embassies resulted in the tragic loss of 224 lives. Why did the State Department not take these warnings more seriously? Why was Congress so shortsighted that it did not protect our overseas operations by providing adequate funding? Why were U.S. intelligence sources so naive in their belief that sub-Saharan Africa did not have a well-organized al-Qaeda network?

Radical Islamists today continue in their quest to control vast regions of North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. Osama bin Laden consistently stated that he considered all non-Muslims infidels and invaders of Muslim soil. He called for a global jihad against all Western powers, with the United States being foremost on the list. This message continues today with Ayman al-Zawahiri, the new al-Qaeda leader. For that reason alone we need to have an embassy in every Muslim country, and actively engage the leaders. We need to reach out to the imams who preach hatred, and support moderate imams who preach peace. Hopefully, our message of friendship will resonate among the youth.

Killing Islamists will not give us a long-lasting, peaceful outcome. Engaging these countries is better than having CIA operatives and troops on the ground. Drone attacks also need to be carefully considered, so as not to radicalize moderate Muslims as we try to kill a radical Islamist leader. Congress needs to understand there is a new breed of Islamists today. The increase of Islamist extremists is alarming, gaining influence in many populous, poverty-stricken Muslim countries. This is the danger we face across North Africa and the Sahel. The closure of several embassies in the 1990s increased our exposure to global terrorism, as al-Qaeda recruited and trained in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. We now have a second generation of trained fighters, who have grown up knowing only conflict, and are as brutal as their predecessors.

But in closed-door Security Council consultations Wednesday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan E. Rice urged the council to support early elections in Mali, noting that U.S. law restricts the United States from providing direct military assistance to Mali because its democratically elected president was ousted in a coup in March. Rice also voiced skepticism about the military capacity of West African forces to prevail in battle with the northern militants.

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed similar concerns.

“A military operation may be required as a last resort to deal with the most hard-line extremist and criminal elements in the north,” Ban wrote in a report to the Security Council.

 Malian military commanders said they were confident they could take the lead — as long as they received assistance, especially from the United States and its armed drones.

The military intervention in Somalia is widely seen as a template for Mali. In Somalia, the al-Qaeda-linked group al-Shabab had seized much of Somalia and imposed harsh decrees in the name of Islam. But by this year, Somalia’s neighbors backed by the United States and the U.N. had pushed the militants out of their major strongholds.

Even if we had 1,000 soldiers, but with a big air component, it will solve the problem,” said Col. Oumar Dao, who is in charge of the military’s major operations. “The drones were effective in Somalia. Look what happened to al-Shabab.”

Related Articles:

The Wall Street Journal
Terror Fight Shifts to Africa
By Julian E. Barnes and Evan Perez, December 7, 2012
Full Story: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323316804578163724113421726.html

The Washington Post
War brewing on the latest front line against terrorism in Mali
By Sudarsan Raghavan and Edward Cody December 7, 2012
Full Story: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/war-brewing-in-the-latest-frontline-against-terrorism-in-mali/2012/12/07/e1320218-349b-11e2-92f0-496af208bf23_story.html