“The Secretary of State has responsibility for the coordination and supervision of all U.S. government activities and operations abroad...must protect all United States Government personnel on official duty….” President George W. Bush noted in his Letter of Instruction addressed to U.S. ambassadors, in January 2002.
I served in three Indian Ocean island nations in east Africa, where I dealt with a number of threats from 2002 to 2005. I was appalled when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton minimized the importance of the killing of Ambassador Christopher Stevens by saying: “What difference--at this point--does it make”. It does make a big difference, since security measures should have been in place to minimize the risk of such a fatal attack.
Ambassadors know the risks of serving in conflicted areas, but with the on-going jihad against the United States, the State Department needed to be better prepared to protect our overseas missions.
After the U.S. embassy in Beirut was attacked in 1983, the Inman (Admiral Bobby Ray Inman) Advisory Panel on Overseas Security issued a report in 1985, which recommended a number of security measures, including setbacks, upgrades to facilities, and new construction of at-risk missions. The study called for the formation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) to oversee security at our overseas operations.
A Regional Security Officer (RSO) was to be assigned as the principal security advisor at all embassies. This person was to oversee the missions’ security staffs, including hiring of local guards and to establish surveillance detection teams; interface with police and military authorities. The RSO would report directly to the deputy chief of mission (DCM), the second in command at the embassy.
In January 2012 the State Department created the Bureau of Counterterrorism to further strengthen the department’s “effort on counterterrorism abroad and to secure the United States against foreign terrorist threats...disrupt and defeat the networks that support terrorism.”
Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb, who oversaw DS operations at the time of the attacks, testified in October 2012 that she was opposed to keeping an embassy security team in Tripoli after they were ordered to leave in August, saying “it would not have made any difference in Benghazi.” Additionally Lamb told the RSO at the embassy “not to bother asking for additional help when the military team was sent home.”
On Wednesday, May 8, 2013, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, held a hearing on the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. Gregory H. Hicks, DCM at the U.S. embassy in Tripoli at the time of the Sept. 11 attack, Eric Nordstrom the RSO, and Mark Thompson acting deputy assistant secretary of state for counterterrorism, all testified on the failure to support besieged Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other American personnel.
Many of the congressional members did not want to listen to the facts regarding the attacks—calling the hearing a political rehash. They also never served in a conflicted area--nor had their lives under siege. They had a myopic view of Libya and the consequences of the U.S.-led military incursion in March 2011, leading to the instability across North Africa and Sahel region.
My experience of working with DCM’s was that they are very competent, and highly trained career diplomats--as were the RSO’s and counterterrorism officers. I placed my full trust in these dedicated officers, who would do everything in their power to protect the ambassador.
A debriefing of these Foreign Service officers, immediately after the Benghazi attacks, would have pin-pointed to the Islamist insurgents. The State Department failed to protect the diplomatic troops.
Secretary Colin Powell and Secretary Condoleezza Rice were both hands-on leaders. At the top of their list of instructions was security at the overseas missions. I doubt whether either would have said: “What difference...does it make”, if a mission was overrun by jihadists and an ambassador killed.
With the security support we received during their leadership, terrorists were not successful in killing any American diplomats--even in the more conflicted areas. Both communicated directly with ambassadors about threat situations. Classified cables received timely responses asking ambassadors to take action to protect U.S. interests, embassy personnel, and American citizens.
I believe the State Department did not have emergency measures in place, to protect the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, and ascertain that military support was readily available in the event of terrorist attacks. Ambassador Stevens needed to operate in a more secure environment, in such an unstable area.
The Arab Spring uprising, which led to the killing of Moammar Gadhafi, saw numerous Islamist militant groups infiltrating the region. Ambassador Stevens knew the risks he faced, and had sent classified cables regarding his concern of terrorist attacks. Such information would have instantaneously reached the Secretary’s office.
The February 17 Martyrs Brigade militia, which had ties to al-Qaeda, was contracted to protect the U.S. consulate. Reportedly, members of the brigade had been warned of possible attacks against the consulate, early in August 2012. Security measures should have been beefed up in Benghazi, knowing the weak Libyan government could not control the well-armed Islamist militias.
U.S. leaders watched in real time, as the events of the U.S. consulate attacks unfolded. Disguising the disastrous ending—by not referring to the attacks as undertaken by Islamist extremists--was a political decision. It can only be seen as gross negligence and incompetence, by those involved in making that unfortunate conclusion.