On May 30, 2013 U.S. Army Gen. Kimberly Field announced the formation of a new “rapid response force” to be established at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. “Specifically trained and ready to respond to a crisis such as Benghazi [which] we didn’t have before”, the general stated.
While serving as U.S. ambassador to three East African island nations, from 2002 to 2005, I was told by U.S. military commanders that rapid response to emergency situations in the Horn of Africa and East Africa was one of the original purposes for establishing the base in Djibouti. Operations have since been expanded for distant missions in parts of Africa and the Middle East.
The African country of Djibouti is strategically located on the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, a key terrorist transit point to Africa, just 17 miles from Yemen. In December 2002 the U.S. Central Command established the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp Lemonnier, the former French Foreign Legion base. The objective was to cover the geographic regions of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Seychelles and Yemen.
The base’s functions were to conduct security operations, counterterrorism training, humanitarian assistance and civil affairs projects. The “real purpose” however, was to deny al-Qaeda from utilizing the Horn of Africa and East Africa as a safe-haven.
The sub-Saharan Africa region had become a dangerous place, with the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, the 2002 bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, and the 2002 attempted missile attack on an Israeli charter aircraft. Al-Qaeda had developed a significant presence--a strong base of operations--and had to be stopped.
Temporary headquarters of the CJTF-HOA were set up in 2002 on the USS Mount Whitney, stationed off the coast of Djibouti, with several hundred military personnel on board, while the base was being completed. In May 2003 the task force became operational for regional military operations.
In 2002 there were three U.S. military commands, with areas of responsibility (AOR) in Africa: European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Central Command (CENTCOM)—all operating independently. With the increase of attacks by Islamists in Iraq, escalating instability in the region, and the expansion of al-Qaeda terrorist cells in the Horn of Africa and East Africa, a Chief of Mission Conference was held in Djibouti in late 2003. At the time there were almost 1,800 military personnel, including Special Operations Forces stationed at the base.
General John Abizaid, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), who oversaw military operations in twenty-seven countries, gave us a regional overview of terrorist concerns and security issues in the region. Gen. Abizaid indicated that increased terrorist activity was linked to an increase of radical imams teaching hatred in the village madrassas--an issue not isolated to any one region.
In March 2004 Gen. Abizaid testifying to Congress, discussed the expansion of al-Qaeda in a number of regions. He also noted that eliminating the senior leadership of al-Qaeda would not eliminate terrorism. To add to the tumultuous situation many al-Qaeda and Arab insurgents recruited by Osama bin Laden to fight the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980′s, had left and found a safe haven in Yemen, while others ended up in the Horn of Africa, East Africa, Sahel and Maghreb regions.
In late 2006 al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings were reportedly embedded with Islamist militias in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. In early January 2007 an offensive began, with Somali and Ethiopian troops pursuing the Islamists. In the battle that ensued, the Islamists fled to several southern towns, including the fishing village of Ras Kamboni, where al-Qaeda had a training camp, few miles from the Kenyan border.
Two AC-130 gunships came from Djibouti to assist with aerial attacks—killing several of the insurgents. A Defense Department spokesman later discussing the attacks said, “As we pursue the War on Terror, we will seek out, locate, capture and if necessary kill terrorists.”
In September 2008, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) unified all three Africa commands, except Egypt which stayed under CENTCOM. The headquarters were established in Stuttgart, Germany. Camp Lemonnier would have been a better choice to directly interface with the CJTF-HOA for operations throughout Africa.
Camp Lemonnier has been expanded to include a squadron of F-15 fighter jets, AC-130 gunships, Blackhawk helicopters and refueling aircraft, In addition there are almost 3,000 military personnel, including 300 Special Operations Forces. A Predator drone fleet has been added, undertaking 24/7 surveillance and attack missions in Africa, Afghanistan, and the Middle East.
Recently a Navy SEALs team was transported by an AC-130 gunship, parachuting at night into a village in Somalia to rescue two hostages held by pirates. In the raid nine insurgents were killed. The freed hostages were then flown back to Djibouti on one of six Blackhawk helicopters participating in the mission. Camp Lemonnier’s trained military force is capable of undertaking almost any type of counterterrorism operation.
In the terrorist attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012, the Djibouti base could have sent military resources to disperse the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamists. The compound was under siege for almost nine hours. The distance of 1,900 miles was within the range of the “combat ready” F-15 fighter jets, AC-130 gunships, and Special Operations Forces.
The State and Defense Departments did not act timely to minimize the disastrous attacks, which possibly could have saved Ambassador Christopher Stevens and the other three American lives. The plea for help from the embassy’s deputy chief of mission in Tripoli went unheeded. A “stand-down order” was given—with no intention of sending in military assistance.
Leon E. Panetta while secretary of defense issued the order for the additional 4,000 military personnel by 2014. The directive was the result of the Libyan security forces hired by the U.S., which failed to protect the diplomatic mission. Mr. Panetta said that the U.S. needed to add “ready assets” for Africa—which does not fairly give credit to the battle-ready troops that are available at Camp Lemonnier.
The CJTF-HOA has been successful in undertaking operations in Africa and beyond, since the military base’s inception in 2003. The available resources could have made a difference in Benghazi. Failing to intervene militarily has only emboldened Islamist extremists to strike again—recently undertaking a number of attacks in North Africa and the Sahel region.